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Abstract
We study the ﬁrms’ choice of whether or not to consider pieces
of information concerning their interdependence. In particular, any
ﬁrm can strategically choose to consider or not the fact that indus-
try output is aﬀected by its own production choice. If this piece of
information is considered, the ﬁrm behaves as an aligopolist; if not,
ﬁrm behaves in a monopolistically competitive way. Thus, the market
regime is endogenously determined. We show that diﬀerent outcomes
can emerge, depending on the number of ﬁrms, the degree of product
substitutability and the cost structure.
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1 Introduction
From a theoretical point of view, the distinction between oligopoly and mo-
nopolistic competition is clear: oligopoly models assume that ﬁrms are aware
of their role in determining industry output and hence the market equilib-
rium, while monopolistic competition models assume that ﬁrms disregard
this piece of information. In other words, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
take as given aggregate output when setting their individual production lev-
els, while oligopolistic ﬁrms explicitly consider the eﬀect that each individual
choice exerts on the total market supply. Basically, the diﬀerence rests on
the role of information concerning the eﬀects of individual choices on aggre-
gate market allocation. According to textbook economic analysis, markets
can be either oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive, and the speciﬁc
nature of a market regime is an exogenous assumption. In this paper we
study the perspective in which ﬁrms can strategically choose whether or not
to consider the eﬀect of their individual decisions on market conﬁguration,
so that the determination of the market regime is endogenously driven by
ﬁrms’ strategic choices.1
Diﬀerent outcomes can emerge, depending on the number of ﬁrms, and
other parameters including the degree of product substitutability. In particu-
lar, the present paper shows that three alternative situations are possible: (1)
only one equilibrium can exist, in which all ﬁrms behave as oligopolistic sub-
jects; this equilibrium is Pareto-eﬃcient for ﬁrms; (2) only one equilibrium
exists, in which all ﬁrms behave as monopolistically competitive units: such
an equilibrium is Pareto-ineﬃcient for ﬁrms as compared to the outcome in
which all ﬁrms are oligopolistic, but the full oligopolistic setting can not be
an equilibrium; (3) two equilibria exist, namely, one in which all ﬁrms behave
as oligopolistic agents, and the other where all ﬁrms behave as monopolis-
tically competitive units, the former being Pareto-eﬃcient for ﬁrms. In any
case, the coexistence of heterogeneous behaviour on the part of ﬁrms in a
given market can not be an equilibrium in pure strategies, since a unilateral
proﬁt incentive for at least one ﬁrm to adopt the alternative behaviour is al-
1Note that the label "endogenous market structure" in this article has a diﬀerent mean-
ing as compared to other studies, in which the ﬁrm choices concern aspects which are not
taken into account in our present study; for instance, the entry or exit decision of individ-
ual producers (see, e.g., Etro 2008, 2011, 2012; Dunne et al. 2013): in our present model
the number of operative ﬁrms is given, and the endegeneity of market structure is linked
to the ﬁrm choices on whether or not to use available information.
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ways present. It is important to underline that we use the concept of Pareto
eﬃciency or ineﬃciency, throughout the entire paper, with reference to the
ﬁrms’ standpoint only; no considerations are developed as far as consumer
surplus and welfare are concerned.
Our model can be read as contribution to the study of the value of in-
formation. We assume that the information concerning the behaviour of all
ﬁrms is freely accessible. In some circumstances, it could be individually
convenient for a ﬁrm to ignore such a piece of information, even if its ac-
quisition is costless. This means that the value of a piece of information
can be negative for a ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm could ﬁnd it optimal to constrain
itself to ignore such a piece of (freely available) information. There is a
comparatively small literature discussing the value of information in games,
where players rationally prefer to ignore some potentially relevant pieces of
information (Kamien, Tauman and Zamir, 1990; Bassan, Scarsini and Za-
mir, 1997; Bassan, Gossner, Scarsini and Zamir, 2003). From this strand of
literature, there clearly emerges that information is not relevant per se, but
rather for the way in which it aﬀects players’ best replies to rivals.2 Another
speciﬁc case in which oligopolistic ﬁrms may ﬁnd it convenient to omit to
consider available pieces of information is presented by Barros (1997). In her
model, by ignoring the information on the actions taken by their (sale) agents,
oligopolistic principals forgo the possibility of appropriating the agents’ ben-
eﬁts from their relation speciﬁc investments, which ends up increasing the
principals’ expected proﬁts.
Diﬀerently from these works, here we investigate the possible beneﬁts
from ignoring pieces of available information concerning strategic interde-
pendency with regard to a population of ﬁrms which may decide to ignore
some essential features of strategic interaction. In order to analyse this is-
sue, we consider a two-stage game where ﬁrms ﬁrst non cooperatively choose
whether or not to use the information concerning the fact that industry out-
put corresponds to the sum of individual output of all ﬁrms, and then, again
non cooperatively, set quantities to maximise proﬁts. Both stages take place
under imperfect, complete and symmetric information.
We study the plausibility of cases in which heterogeneous behavioural
rules concerning the use of information related to strategic interaction co-
2Along related research lines, we may mention Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld (1996),
showing that a Bayesian agent may ﬁnd it rational to pay not to see some pieces of
information. Safra and Sugarik (1993) make a similar point for cases in which agents do
not choose according to the expected utility principle.
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exist in a given market. The fact that asymmetric ﬁrms do coexist in an
industry is far from being a novelty. Asymmetry is studied as far as ﬁrms’
size, goal, internal organization, and so on, is concerned. In a recent article,
for instance, Chirco et al. (2013) provide a wide and up-dated literature
review on theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers supporting the co-
existence of heterogeneous motives for ﬁrms in a given oligopolistic market,
with speciﬁc attention to the delegation of the market phase decisions to
managers. More directly connected to the point of our paper, Kokovin et al.
(2014) present a model in which oligopolistic and monopolistically competi-
tive ﬁrms interact simultaneously in markets with diﬀerentiated products. In
their model, however, the behavioral asymmetry across ﬁrms is linked to ex-
ogenously given ﬁrm size (see also Shimomura and Thisse, 2012). Similarly,
Anderson et al. (2013) develop and use the concept of ‘aggregative game’ to
analyze the free entry of ﬁrms in markets where oligopolistic and monopolisti-
cally competitive producers co-exist. Diﬀerently from these works, we do not
assume ex-ante asymmetry in ﬁrm size, nor are we interested in the free-entry
long-run equilibrium. The result we obtain is that the proﬁt incentives of
quantity-setting ﬁrms exclude the adoption of asymmetric behavioural rules
at the pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game, so
that the observation of asymmetric attitudes (i.e., the simultaneous presence
of oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive ﬁrms in any given indus-
try) must be associated with the strategic uncertainty going hand in hand
with the probabilistic structure of the mixed strategy equilibrium that must
necessarily be accounted for when two pure-strategy equilibria exist.
We begin, in Section 2, with the analysis of the simplest case where only
two ﬁrms operate in the market, characterising the map of best reply func-
tions in oligopoly versus their counterparts in monopolistic competition. In
a Digression (Section 2.2) we show that our results largely replicate (with
a minor caveat) those emerging from the comparison between proﬁt-seeking
and managerial ﬁrms if managerial incentives are based on comparative proﬁt
performance, à laMiller and Pazgal (2001). At the end of this Digression, we
also brieﬂy discuss the literature suggesting that oligopolistic producers can
use ‘divisionalization’ as a commitment to ignore relevant pieces of strategic
interdependence. In Section 3, we extend the picture to allow for the pres-
ence of n > 2 ﬁrms. In this context, we analyse the case in which all ﬁrms are
either oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive, to study the individual
incentive to switch towards the alternative behaviour. Subsequently we study
the mixed setting where oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
4
coexist in a market. Here, we show that the situation in which at least one
ﬁrm ﬁnds it convenient to change its behaviour concerning the consideration
of strategic interdependence, is the rule: this amounts to saying that the co-
existence of oligopolistic ﬁrms and monopolistically competitive ﬁrms within
a given industry is not an equilibrium. Section 4 presents some extensions
as well as additional considerations supporting the robustness of our model.
Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 The two-ﬁrm benchmark
Two single-product ﬁrms (i, j) operate in a market for diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, and set output levels to maximise individual proﬁts. We adopt a slightly
simpliﬁed version of the linear demand system used by Ottaviano, Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008):
ph = a− βqh − σQ (1)
where ph and qh are the price and output level of ﬁrm h (h = i, j), while Q
is the overall industry output. We assume a > 0, β ≥ 0, σ ≥ 0. The two
varieties are homogeneous under the limiting case β = 0 (in which case the
price looses its index), while they become independent under the limiting case
σ = 0. Cost functions are ch = cqh + bq
2
h, with parameters c, b > 0 common
to both ﬁrms. Hence, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function is πi = (pi − c) qi − bq2i .
The heart of the matter is the information about the fact that Q = qi+qj .
If a ﬁrm is (or chooses to be) myopic in this respect, then it writes its own
demand function as in (1) and takes Q as a parameter when setting the
optimal choice, otherwise the demand function takes the standard form we
are accustomed with from oligopoly theory:
pi = a− βqi − σ (qi + qj) . (2)
To this regard, it is worth noting that one can rewrite (2) as
pi = a− γqi − σqj (3)
with γ ≡ β + σ, so that (3) is indeed the same demand function introduced
by Bowley (1924), and then revisited by Spence (1976), Dixit (1979) and
Singh and Vives (1984), inter alia. The striking diﬀerence between (1) on
one side and (2) or (3) on the other is that (1) implies that ﬁrm i is unaware
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of its own role in determining the industry output (and Q is interpreted as a
parameter when the ﬁrm sets its optimal choice), while exactly the opposite
message is conveyed by (2-3). Put diﬀerently, (1) is the demand function
of a ﬁrm operating in a monopolistically competitive fashion, while (2-3)
is associated with a ﬁrm that is operating under oligopolistic competition.
In principle, one could expect the latter to perform better than the former,
precisely because of the use of available information (as against the lack
thereof). Counterintuitively enough, we are setting out to show that, indeed,
this is not necessarily true.
Proceeding by backward induction, we set out with the analysis of the
market stage.
Let’s start with the duopolistic Cournot setup, in which both ﬁrms are
aware of their roles in determining the total output, and (2) is the relevant de-
mand function. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for the maximum individual
proﬁt of i is
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β + σ) qi − σqj − c = 0 (4)
that yields the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium output level
qss =
a− c
2 (b+ β) + 3σ
(5)
and the associated proﬁts
πss =
(a− c)2 (b+ β + σ)
[2 (b+ β) + 3σ]2
(6)
where superscripts ss denote that both ﬁrms are smart. We use the label
smart to indicate that a ﬁrm is aware, when it makes its choice, that the
whole market output Q is the sum of the individual production levels.
Next, we consider the opposite situation in which both ﬁrms are unaware
of their roles when setting the optimal quantities; we label them as myopic,
and the resulting FOC is
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β) qi − σQ− c = 0. (7)
Only after the determination of the individual optimal production, we plug
Q = qi + qj into (7), and rewrite it as
a− 2 (b+ β) qi − σ (qi + qj)− c = 0 (8)
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and ﬁnally impose symmetry on individual outputs and solve the FOC to
obtain
qmm =
a− c
2 (b+ β + σ)
. (9)
This amounts to saying that each ﬁrm takes into account the eﬀect of its
choice in shaping industry output only after having made a decision about
its own production plan. Equilibrium proﬁts are
πmm =
(a− c)2 (b+ β)
4 (b+ β + σ)2
. (10)
Superscripts mm denote that both ﬁrms are myopic.
The last case is the mixed one where i is a smart ﬁrm interacting with j,
which instead is a myopic one. Here the FOCs are
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β + σ) qi − σqj − c = 0
∂πj
∂qj
= a− 2 (b+ β) qi − σQ− c = 0
(11)
which, using Q = qi + qj , results in
qsmi =
2 (a− c) (b+ β)
4 (b+ β)2 + σ [σ + 6 (b+ β)]
; qmsj =
(a− c) [2 (b+ β) + σ]
4 (b+ β)2 + σ [σ + 6 (b+ β)]
(12)
with proﬁts
πsmi =
4 (a− c)2 (b+ β)2 (b+ β + σ)
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σ + 6 (b+ β))
2 ; πmsj = (a− c)2 (b+ β) [2 (b+ β) + σ]2
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σ + 6 (b+ β))
2 .
(13)
>From (12-13) it is immediate to verify that
qsmi < q
ms
j and π
sm
i < π
ms
j (14)
i.e., the myopic ﬁrm is bigger and richer than the smart one.
An intuitive explanation for the above results can be found in the features
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of the map of best replies (11), from which we have that3
q∗i (qj) =
a− c− σqj
2 (b+ β + σ)
⇒ ∂q
∗
i (qj)
∂qj
= − σ
2 (b+ β + σ)
q∗j (qi) =
a− c− σqi
2 (b+ β) + σ
⇒ ∂q
∗
j (qi)
∂qi
= − σ
2 (b+ β) + σ
(15)
with
σ
2 (b+ β + σ)
<
σ
2 (b+ β) + σ
for all b, β, σ > 0. (16)
This reveals that q∗j (qi) is steeper than q
∗
i (qj) . Moreover, the intercept of
q∗j (qi) is higher than that of q
∗
i (qj) , since
a− c
2 (b+ β + σ)
<
a− c
2 (b+ β) + σ
for all b, β, σ > 0. (17)
Taken together, these two properties yield
Lemma 1 A myopic ﬁrm has a steeper but higher best reply function than a
smart ﬁrm. Therefore, the intersection of best replies is not symmetric and
reveals the presence of a strategic advantage for the ﬁrm that ‘does not know’,
provided that the opponent does know.
The map of best replies drawn in ﬁgure 1 will help understand what is
going on in this market.
3The best reply function of the myopic ﬁrm is a ﬁctitious artifact, as literally a myopic
ﬁrm is not a strategic agent. However, plugging Q = qi + qj into (7) it is possible to
obtain the expression q∗j (qi) , describing the behaviour of the myopic unit as if it behaved
strategically.
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Figure 1 (Smartness vs myopia) Best reply functions in the quantity space
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The thin lines are the best replies of smart (i.e., Cournot) ﬁrms, while
the thick ones correspond to the behaviour of the myopic ﬁrms. The in-
terception points of either symmetric best reply pair describe the equilibria
of this market when both ﬁrms are either smart or myopic, and belong to
the 45-degree line (not drawn, for simplicity). The remaining two intercep-
tion points of coordinates (12) are relevant in the cases where information
about the composition of industry output Q is asymmetric between ﬁrms.
A thick pair of isoproﬁt curves is drawn in correspondence of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. Now observe that being myopic when the rival is smart
allows the myopic ﬁrm to reach an isoproﬁt curve necessarily higher than it
would be if the opponent were equally myopic. Conversely, the smart ﬁrm
ﬁnds itself in the unpleasant situation of being forced to locate onto a lower
isoproﬁt curve as compared to what would happen if the rival were smart as
well. This is the case of the thin pair of isoproﬁt curves associated with the
interception between ﬁrm i’s thin reaction function with ﬁrm j’s thick reac-
tion function. In the Digression presented in Section 2.2 below we will show
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that the mechanism at work is largely similar to what happens in models of
strategic managerial delegation (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987;
Sklivas, 1987; Miller and Pazgal, 2001).
Now, in order to understand whether this type of myopia or ignorance can
emerge as part of the subgame perfect equilibrium, we proceed backwards to
investigate the choice between knowing (or, being smart) and not knowing
(or, being myopic) thatQ = qi+qj before taking FOCs. To do so, we examine
the 2 × 2 game shown in Matrix 1, that precedes the quantity stage. Pure
strategies are denoted as s for smart and m for myopic.
Matrix 1: The ﬁrst stage
2
s m
1 s πss, πss πsm, πms
m πms, πsm πmm, πmm
This is a pre-play stage characterised by complete, symmetric and imper-
fect information, i.e., simultaneous moves. Its outcome is driven by the sign
of πms − πss and πmm − πsm, accompanied by the ancillary inequality
πss − πmm = (a− c)
2 [3 (b+ β) + 4σ] σ2
4 (b+ β + σ)2 [2 (b+ β) + 3σ]2
> 0 (18)
that will univocally determine the ranking of equilibria if Matrix 1 turns out
to be a coordination game with two equilibria along the main diagonal; or
whether the game is a prisoners’ dilemma or not in case there should exist a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
We may now assess πms − πss, to see that
πms − πss ∝ − 4 (b+ β) (b+ β + s)2 + σ3 < 0 (19)
always, so that πss > πms over the entire parameter constellation.
Conversely,
πmm−πsm ∝ −[48b3+8b2(12β−σ)+16b(3β2−βσ+σ2)−σ(44β2+68βσ+49σ2)]
(20)
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The sign of the above expression is clearly ambiguous, meaning that the
unilateral deviation from the fully myopic allocation may be or not con-
venient, depending on the parameter conﬁguration. Some tedious alge-
bra leads to show that (20) is positive (meaning that the fully myopic al-
location is an equilibrium) for all β if 5σ ≥ 6b and for β ≤ β0 (with
β0 = (17σ
2+4bσ−24b2+√2σ(6b−5σ)3/2)/(24b−22σ)) if 5σ < 6b. Otherwise,
under the condition 5σ < 6b joint with β > β0, the sign is negative, meaning
that the smart behaviour is the optimal response to the myopic choice of the
opponent. Thus, a single and Pareto-eﬃcient pure-strategy equilibrium at
(s, s), generated by the intersection of dominant strategies, exists, when pa-
rameter σ is relatively small (namely, smaller than 6b/5) and parameter β is
larger than a threshold level; in the opposite case, when parameter σ is large,
or in any case when parameter β is small, a coordination game establishes,
with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in (s, s) and (m,m).
To interpret these results, one has to keep in mind that σ measures the
intensity of the interplay between the myopic ﬁrm and the industry as a
whole. The lower is σ, the higher the degree of product diﬀerentiation. If σ
is small enough, revealing the presence of a high degree of product diﬀerenti-
ation, then being smart is, so to speak, compulsory. Otherwise, as σ increases
we observe a variety of equilibria, including the possibility of converging to
the ‘fully myopic’ outcome. In particular, within this parameter region, it is
proﬁtable for a given player to choose to be myopic, given the suspect that
the opponent is myopic. It is true, however, that the fully myopic outcome
is Pareto-ineﬃcient for ﬁrms as compared to the fully smart outcome.
A very simple numerical simulation may help understand the point: Ma-
trices 2(A) and 2(B) provide the ﬁrm proﬁt levels under two diﬀerent pa-
rameter conﬁgurations. Both cases consider the parameter constellation:
(a − c)2 = 100, b = 1, β = 1, then case (A) assumes σ = 1 while case (B)
assumes σ = 2 . In case (A), only one equilibrium exists (namely, (s, s)),
while in case (B) two pure-strategy equilibria exist, (s, s) and (m,m). In
both cases, the allocation (m,m) is Pareto-ineﬃcient for ﬁrms with respect
to (s, s) , be it an equilibrium or not.
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Matrix 2 - Proﬁt levels
case (A) case (B)
2
s m
1 s 42.8 ; 42.8 5.7 ; 9.9
m 9.9 ; 5.7 5.5 ; 5.5
2
s m
1 s 100; 100 3.3; 3.7
m 3.7; 3.3 12.5; 12.5
Note: (a− c)2 = 100, b = β = 1; (A) σ = 1; (B) σ = 2.
Qualitatively, the two cases shown by Matrices 2(A) and 2(B) are the
only possible situations emerging in the game at hand.
2.1 The mixed strategy equilibrium
The arising of a coordination game for all σ > 2

1 +
√
2

(b+ β) prompts
for the analysis of the solution in mixed strategies. Deﬁne the probabilities
that ﬁrm i attaches to pure strategies s and m as pis and pim = 1 − pis,
respectively, with pis, pim ∈ [0, 1] . Given the full symmetry existing a priori
between ﬁrms, it will suﬃce to solve a single indiﬀerence condition, which
can be written as follows:
Eπj (s)−Eπj (m) = pisπss+(1− pis) πsm−pisπms−(1− pis) πmm = 0 (21)
where E is the expected value operator, so that Eπj (u) is the expected value
of the proﬁts accruing to ﬁrm j if it plays strategy u = s,m, for any vector
of probabilities attached by ﬁrm i to its own pure strategies. The task that
ﬁrm i must perform is to solve equation (21) so as to identify the equilibrium
value of probabilities p∗is and 1 − p∗is which make ﬁrm j indiﬀerent between
pure strategies s and m. This yields:
p∗is =
πsm − πmm
πsm − πmm + πms − πss ∈ (0, 1) ∀σ > 2

1 +
√
2

(b+ β) . (22)
This automatically implies pim ∈ (0, 1) , and
Proposition 2 A heterogeneous industry structure arises at the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium, for all σ > 2

1 +
√
2

(b+ β) .
This, of course, is implicit in the coordination problem associated with
multiple equilibria and imperfect information, but suﬃces to reveal that even
in the simplest setting with two ﬁrms the amount of information concerning
the composition of industry output could well diﬀer across them.
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2.2 Digression: strategic delegation
Before extending our model to account for the case in which more than
two ﬁrms supply the market, it is worth reporting that our problem closely
resembles the choice of delegation contracts to managers in a duopoly game
based on (1). The ensuing exposition can be viewed as an extension of
the strategic delegation game investigated by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and
Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) and Miller and Pazgal (2001), inter alia, and
may help us sketch the intuitive explanation of what will be going on in the
setup on which our attention is focused.
Along this line of research, the structure of the model is a two-stage game,
with delegation contracts being designed by ﬁrms’ owners in the ﬁrst stage
and Cournot interaction taking place (among managers, if any) in the second.
Deﬁne the objective function of the manager in control of ﬁrm j as
Mj = πj +

θj + ξjqi

qj (23)
where variables

θj, ξj

are speciﬁed by shareholders in the delegation con-
tract in order to maximise their own proﬁts. Observe that the managerial
incentive appearing inMj contains the multiplicative eﬀect ξjqiqj, which has
not been considered so far in the literature on strategic delegation. If ξj = 0,
the managerial objective function (23) indeed coincides with that appearing
in Vickers (1985).4 If instead θj = 0, then (23) is equivalent to the delega-
tion scheme used by Miller and Pazgal (2001), based on comparative proﬁt
performance. In their paper, Miller and Pazgal suppose that the manager of
ﬁrm j be rewarded in proportion to	Mj = πj − ζjπi, (24)
where ζj is to be chosen by owners so as to maximise πj . Observe that the
ﬁrst order condition describing the behaviour of manager j is
∂	Mj
∂qj
=
∂πj
∂qj
− ζj
∂πi
∂qj
=
∂πj
∂qj
− ζjσqi = 0 (25)
yielding the best reply function:
q∗j (qi) =
a− c− σ 1− ζj qi
2 (b+ β + σ)
. (26)
4In such a case, it also coincides with the incentive scheme used by Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), as shown in Lambertini and Trombetta (2002, Appendix
A, p. 371).
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At the ﬁrst stage, owners noncooperatively and simultaneously maximise
proﬁts w.r.t. the delegation contract variable ζj, whereby the unique sym-
metric Nash equilibrium is
ζ∗ =
σ
2 (b+ β) + σ
. (27)
Now, back to our approach, manager j must choose qj so as to maximise
Mj in (23). The resulting FOC is the following:
∂Mj
∂qj
= a− 2 (b+ β + σ) qi −

σ + ξj

qj − c+ θj = 0, (28)
producing the best reply function:
q∗j (qi) =
a− c+ θj −

σ − ξj

qi
2 (b+ β + σ)
(29)
which coincides with (26) if θi = θj = 0 and ξj = σζj. Indeed, so it turns out
at the subgame perfect equilibrium, where the proﬁt maximising contracts
chosen by managers are denoted by
ξ∗j = ξ
∗
i =
σ2
2 (b+ β) + σ
= σζ∗ (30)
in correspondence of θi = θj = 0. This shows that:
Lemma 3 Under Cournot competition, and for any admissible degree of
product diﬀerentiation, a delegation contract based on comparative proﬁt per-
formance is equivalent to requiring the manager to maximise an objective
function corresponding to the sum of the ﬁrm’s own proﬁts plus the delega-
tion variable multiplied by the product of ﬁrms’ output levels.
This is an intuitive consequence of the fact that the partial derivative of
ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function w.r.t. ﬁrm j’s output is in fact the derivative of the
product of the two output levels. Therefore, Mj and 	Mj must necessarily
generate exactly the same subgame perfect equilibrium.
Moreover, note that the vertical intercept of the best reply in (29) is
(a− c+ θj) / [2 (b+ β + σ)] , while the slope is
∂q∗j (qi)
∂qi
= − σ − ξj
2 (b+ β + σ)
< 0 ∀σ > ξj , (31)
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otherwise the reaction function of ﬁrm j becomes increasing in the rival’s
output level. Accordingly, suppose σ > ξj. The overall eﬀect of this delega-
tion contract is therefore the combination of (i) an outward shift of ﬁrm j’s
best reply function for all θj > 0, as we know from Vickers (1985), and (ii) a
rotation of the (decreasing) best reply, since the latter becomes ﬂatter as ξj
increases. If ξj = σ, then ∂q
∗
j (qi) /∂qi = 0 and the reaction function is totally
ﬂat, the manager playing then a dominant strategy in the market subgame.
Both eﬀects concur in moving the best reply function, grossly speaking, in
the same direction, provoking thus an output expansion on the part of ﬁrm
j, all else equal.
This situation is represented in ﬁgure 2, which clearly resembles ﬁgure
1.5 The thin lines are the best replies of pure proﬁt-seeking agents setting
θj = ξj = 0, while the thick ones are those of managerial ﬁrms setting θj > 0
and ξj ∈ (0, σ). Isoproﬁt curves are drawn only in correspondence of the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium among pure proﬁt-seeking entrepreneurial units.
The equilibria of the asymmetric cases, in which a managerial ﬁrm interacts
with an entrepreneurial rival, are identiﬁed by the intersection points of a
‘thick’ best reply with a ‘thin’ one. In either of these points, delegation clearly
improves the position of the ﬁrm which has hired a manager vis à vis that
of the entrepreneurial counterpart by virtue of the outward movement of the
reaction function, causing an expansion of the managerial ﬁrm’s production
and a corresponding restriction of the entrepreneurial’s one.
As we have seen, a somewhat analogous mechanism is at work in the
model we are focussing upon, concerning the use of information on industry
output and its eﬀects on strategic interaction. Substantially, any instrument
allowing a ﬁrm to move its reaction function outwards is, all else equal, proﬁt-
enhancing, and is therefore liable to be used to this aim. This Digression is
relevant to our argument, precisely because it provides an example of a mean-
ingful mechanism device through which a ﬁrm can replicate the commitment
to disregard strategic interdependence: such mechanism can be represented
by the managerial delegation with a manager remuneration based on (23).
5Except for the fact that here delegation also aﬀects the intercepts of best replies. More-
over, for the sake of simplicity, a single pair of isoproﬁt curves is drawn, in correspondence
of the intersection of the reaction functions of pure proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms.
15
Figure 2 (Delegation game) Best reply functions in the quantity space
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A diﬀerent device through which a producer can replicate the commitment
to disregard strategic interdependence is suggested by the literature that
studies ‘divisionalization’, that is, the creation by a ﬁrm of divisions that
compete independently in the market (see e.g., Baye et al., 1996; Ziss, 1998).
The idea is that a multiproduct ﬁrm, aware of the interdependencies among
its products, may delegate the choices concerning any single product to an
independent manager unaware of those interdependencies. Divisionalization
entails pros and cons, but the strategic incentive for a ﬁrm to divisionalize
rests on a commitment to more aggressive behavior, which increases the ﬁrm’s
market share at the expenses of its rivals. A model in which divisionalization
can arise as the optimal choice for a big (oligopolistic) ﬁrm that competes
with a fringe of small monopolistically competitive rivals is presented by
Kokovin et al. (2014). In their model, depending on the market demand
conﬁguration, the big ﬁrm may ﬁnd it convenient to be broken down into
horizontal proﬁt-maximizing divisions that disregard their interdependencies
and behave like monopolistically competitive units.
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3 The N-ﬁrm setting
Consider now the more general case where the same market (i.e., leaving
unmodiﬁed the initial assumptions concerning the demand system and tech-
nology), is served by N single-product ﬁrms. In the remainder, we will con-
sider two diﬀerent but closely related perspectives. The ﬁrst is that where
a single ﬁrm chooses whether to be smart or myopic given a homogeneous
choice by the remaining N−1 ﬁrms. This exercise will enlighten us as to the
existence (or lack) of an individual proﬁt incentive to deviate from the fully
symmetric outcome in which the entire population of ﬁrms in the industry is
alternatively smart or myopic. The second perspective will consider a generic
composition of the industry, assuming that K = 1, 2, 3, ...k ﬁrms are myopic
and the remaining N −K = k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, ...n are smart. Our aim will
be to see whether there exists a stable partition of the population of ﬁrms
into a smart group and a myopic one.
3.1 Unilateral deviations
To begin with, we may brieﬂy review the ‘fully smart industry equilibrium’,
that is, the Cournot-Nash outcome generated by the system of demand func-
tions:
pi = a− βqi − σ


qi +

j =i
qj

. (32)
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm i being deﬁned as πi = (pi − c) qi − bq2i , one has
to solve the set of N FOCs:
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β + σ) qi − σ

j =i
qj − c = 0 (33)
in order to ﬁnd the vector of symmetric equilibrium outputs:
qss (n) =
a− c
2 (b+ β) + σ (n+ 1)
(34)
and proﬁts:
πss (n) =
(a− c)2 (b+ β + σ)
[2 (b+ β) + σ (n+ 1)]2
. (35)
Now we turn our attention to individual deviations from this symmetric
outcome. Consider the perspective of a single ﬁrm assessing the proﬁtability
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of defecting unilaterally from (34) and become myopic. In such a case, ﬁrm
i faces (45), while any competitor j = i faces (32). The resulting FOCs are:
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β) qi − σQ− c = 0 (36)
for the single myopic ﬁrm, and
∂πj
∂qj
= a− 2 (b+ β + σ) qj − σQ−j − c = 0 (37)
for each of its n − 1 smart rivals. On the r.h.s. of the above equation,
Q−j =

ℓ=j qℓ. The above system is solved by a vector of outputs composed
by a single quantity qms and n− 1 quantities qsm :
qms (1, n− 1) = (a− c) [2 (b+ β) + σ]
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σ + 2b (n+ 1)] + 2β [4b+ σ (n+ 1)]
qsm (n− 1, 1) = 2 (a− c) (b+ β)
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σ + 2b (n+ 1)] + 2β [4b+ σ (n+ 1)]
(38)
with
qms (1, n− 1)−qsm (n− 1, 1) = (a− c)σ
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σ + 2b (n+ 1)] + 2β [4b+ σ (n+ 1)]
> 0.
(39)
That is,
Lemma 4 If all rivals are smart, being individually myopic allows a sin-
gle ﬁrm to expand output, irrespective of the overall number of ﬁrms in the
industry.
The associated proﬁts are
πms (1, n− 1) = (a− c)
2 [2 (b+ β) + σ]2 (b+ β)
[4(b+ β)2 + σ (σ + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))]2
(40)
and
πsm (n− 1, 1) = 4 (a− c)
2 (b+ β)2 (b+ β + σ)
[4(b+ β)2 + σ (σ + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))]2
. (41)
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The unilateral deviation from smart to myopic is convenient if and only if
πms (1, n− 1) > πss (n): it can be easily checked that such a inequality is
quadratic in n, and it is met iﬀ:
(b+ β)

σ2 (n (n− 2)− 4)− 4 (b+ β) (b+ β + σ)− σ3 > 0. (42)
The l.h.s. of (42) is nil at
n± =
σ (b+ β)± [2 (b+ β) + σ]

(b+ β) (b+ β + σ)
σ (b+ β)
. (43)
Notice that a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for (42) to apply is n ≥
4, since otherwise n (n− 2) − 4 < 0 and therefore the entire expression is
necessarily negative (in line with what we already know from the initial
analysis of the two-ﬁrm case); notice also that n− < 4 everywhere, while
n+ ≥ 4 if
(b+ β + σ) [2 (b+ β) + σ] ≥ 9 (b+ β) σ2. (44)
The analysis of this case boils down to:
Lemma 5 In the region identiﬁed by n > n+ ≡ 1+(1+2(b+β)/σ)

1 + σ/(b+ β)
and (b+ β + σ) [2 (b+ β) + σ] ≥ 9 (b+ β) σ2, the unilateral deviation from
the fully smart outcome is proﬁtable.
That is to say, for a ﬁrm to ﬁnd it convenient to be myopic in front of a
population of smart rivals, the industry must be suﬃciently fragmented (and
this must be accompanied by other conditions connecting cost and demand
parameters).
Now it’s time to deal with the opposite scenario, that is, the case where
a single ﬁrm, say, ﬁrm i, deviates from the fully myopic outcome to become
smart. The relevant demand system in the fully myopic case is
pi = a− bqi − σQ (45)
which generates the following FOC:
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β) qi − σQ− c = 0. (46)
Imposing symmetry across ﬁrms and replacing Q with nq, one obtains the
equilibrium output
qmm (n) =
a− c
2 (b+ β) + nσ
(47)
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and the corresponding proﬁts
πmm (n) =
(a− c)2 (b+ β)
[2 (b+ β) + nσ]2
. (48)
If ﬁrm i conjectures to become individually smart, her demand function
writes as in (32), while any of the remaining n − 1 myopic rivals faces the
demand function (45), so that the FOCs are:
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ β + σ) qi − σQ−i − c = 0 (49)
for the single smart ﬁrm, and
∂πj
∂qj
= a− 2 (b+ β) qj − σQ− c = 0 (50)
for each of its n−1 myopic rivals. Imposing symmetry among the latter, the
equilibrium outputs obtain:
qsm (1, n− 1) = 2 (a− c) (b+ β)
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σ + 2b (n+ 1)] + 2β [4b+ σ (n+ 1)]
qms (n− 1, 1) = (a− c) [2 (b+ β) + σ]
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σ + 2b (n+ 1)] + 2β [4b+ σ (n+ 1)]
(51)
with qsm (1, n− 1) < qms (n− 1, 1), and the resulting proﬁts are
πsm (1, n− 1) = 4 (a− c)
2 (b+ β)2 (b+ β + σ)
[2 (b+ β) (2 (b+ β) + (n+ 1)σ) + (n− 1)σ2]2 (52)
and
πms (n− 1, 1) = (a− c)
2 (b+ β) [2 (b+ β) + σ]2
[2 (b+ β) (2 (b+ β) + (n+ 1) σ) + (n− 1) σ2]2 . (53)
The unilateral deviation from the fully myopic setting is proﬁtable iﬀ
πsm (1, n− 1)− πmm (n) ∝ 4 (b+ β) [b+ β + σ]− (n− 1)2 σ2 > 0. (54)
The above condition is satisﬁed for all
0 < σ <
2

1 +

2 + n (n− 2)

(b+ β)
(n− 1)2 . (55)
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Note that, if n = 2, the above conclusion obviously coincides with the result
derived in section 2. Also observe that the upper bound in (55) monoton-
ically decreases in n. Overall, this leads to the following conclusion: if the
impact of aggregate industry output on individual performance - as mea-
sured by parameter σ - is not too relevant, the unilateral deviation from the
fully myopic outcome is proﬁtable. On the contrary, if parameter σ is large
(revealing the presence of a low degree of product diﬀerentiation), then the
unilateral deviation from the fully myopic equilibrium is not proﬁtable.
Clearly, condition (54) may be written also as (n−1)2 < 4(b+β)(b+β+
σ)/σ2. Hence,
Lemma 6 In the region identiﬁed by n < 1 + 2

(b+ β)(b+ β + σ)/σ, the
unilateral deviation from the fully myopic outcome is proﬁtable
This means that the number of ﬁrms serving the market has to be limited,
for the unilateral deviation from the fully myopic outcome being individually
proﬁtable. In such a case, the fully myopic setting is not an equilibrium. The
larger the number of ﬁrms is, the more likely that the fully myopic setting is
an equilibrium, where the unilateral deviation is not proﬁtable. In any case,
the fully myopic setting is Pareto ineﬃcient for ﬁrms, irrespective of whether
or not the individual deviation is proﬁtable.
3.1.1 Is there a stable partition?
Consider the case in which the industry consists of K = 1, 2, 3, ...k myopic
ﬁrms and N −K = k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, ...n smart ones. To characterise the
game, it suﬃces to look at two of these ﬁrm, a smart one, say, i, and a myopic
one, say, j. Their respective demand functions are:
pi = a− βqi − σ

qi +

ℓ=i qℓ

pj = a− βqj − σQ
(56)
The FOCs are:
∂πi
∂qi
= a− 2 (b+ s) qi − s (qj +QK−j +QN−K−i)− c = 0
∂πj
∂qj
= a− 2 (b+ β) qj − sQ− c = 0
(57)
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where QK−j it the collective output of the myopic group (except j) and
QN−K−i is the collective output of the smart group (except i). We may
now plug Q =
n
ℓ=1 qℓ into the second and impose symmetry within each
sub-population of ﬁrms to solve the system and ﬁnd the equilibrium outputs
qsm (n− k, k) = 2 (a− c) (b+ β)
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σk + 2β (n+ 1)] + 2b [4β + (n+ 1) σ]
(58)
qms (k, n− k) = (a− c) [2 (b+ β) + σ]
4

b2 + β2

+ σ [σk + 2β (n+ 1)] + 2b [4β + (n+ 1) σ]
(59)
and the corresponding proﬁts6
πsm (n− k, k) = 4 (a− c)
2 (b+ β)2 (b+ β + σ)
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σk + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))
2 (60)
πms (k, n− k) = (a− c)
2 (b+ β) [2 (b+ β) + σ]2
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σk + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))
2 . (61)
As before, also here we have qms (k, n− k) > qsm (n− k, k) and πms (k, n− k) >
πsm (n− k, k) irrespective of the numerosity and composition of the popula-
tion of ﬁrms. However,
∂ [πms (k, n− k)− πsm (n− k, k)]
∂k
=
− 2 (a− c)
2 (b+ β)σ4
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σk + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))
3 < 0, (62)
i.e., the proﬁt diﬀerential monotonically decreases as the number of myopic
ﬁrms increases.
To carry out our analysis, we borrow from coalition theory a standard
method that has already been used successfully in the theory of industrial
organization to study the optimal size of cartels operating in markets where
a competitive fringe is also present (see d’Aspremont et al., 1983; Donsimoni,
Economides and Polemarchakis, 1986).
We want to establish whether there exists a number k ∈ [1, n− 1] such
that the partition {K,N −K} is stable. This requires two incentive com-
patibility constraints to be simultaneously satisﬁed:
6It can be easily veriﬁed that, if k = 0, (58) and (60) coincide with (34) and (35),
respectively. If instead k = n, (59) and (61) coincide with (47) and (48), respectively. The
same applies for unilateral deviation proﬁts, using k = 1 and k = n− 1.
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A] it must not be individually proﬁtable for a myopic ﬁrm in K to abandon
it and join the set of smart ﬁrms (in which case the number of myopic
ﬁrms would decrease to k − 1 while that of smart ones would increase
to n− k + 1); and
B] likewise, it must not be individually proﬁtable for a smart ﬁrm in N −K
to quit this group to become a myopic one (in which case the number
of myopic ﬁrms would increase to k+1 while that of smart ones would
decrease to n− k − 1).
Conditions A and B are respectively equivalent to saying that there must
exists a number k ∈ [1, n− 1] such that
πms (k, n− k) ≥ πsm (n− k + 1, k − 1)⇔ (63)
[2 (b+ β) + σ]2
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σk + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))
2 ≥
4 (b+ β) (b+ β + σ)
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σ (k − 1) + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))2
and
πsm (n− k, k) ≥ πms (k + 1, n− k − 1)⇔ (64)
4 (b+ β) (b+ β + σ)
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σk + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))
2 ≥
[2 (b+ β) + σ]2
4 (b+ β)2 + σ (σ (k + 1) + 2 (b+ β) (n+ 1))
2
be simultaneously satisﬁed.
Inequality (63) is met iﬀ
Ψ = σ4 (k − 1)2 − 4σ3 (b+ β) [n− k (n− 1)] + (65)
4σ2 (b+ β)2 [n (n− 2)− 4]− 32σ (b+ β)3 − 16 (b+ β)4 ≥ 0
which holds true for all k outside the interval identiﬁed by the roots of Ψ = 0:
k± = 2

−σ (n− 1) (b+ β) + σ2 ± (2 (b+ β) + σ)(b+ β) (b+ β + σ)
σ2
(66)
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with k− < 0 for all admissible values of {b, n, β, σ} , and k+ ≥ 2 iﬀ
4 (b+ β) (b+ β + σ) [2 (b+ β) + σ]2 ≥ σ2 [2 (n− 1) (b+ β) + σ]2 . (67)
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for (64) to hold is
Ω = −σ4k2 − 4σ3 (b+ β) [k (n− 1)− 1] (68)
−4σ2 (b+ β)2 [n (n− 2)− 4] + 32σ (b+ β)3 + 16 (b+ β)4 ≥ 0
which in turn is satisﬁed by all k lying inside the interval of the roots of
Ω = 0:
k± = 2

−σ (n− 1) (b+ β)± (2 (b+ β) + σ)(b+ β) (b+ β + σ)
σ2
(69)
with k− < 0 for all admissible values of {b, n, β, σ} , and k+ ≥ 2 in the
parameter region identiﬁed by
(b+ β) (b+ β + σ) [2 (b+ β) + σ]2 ≥ σ2 [(n− 1) (b+ β) + σ]2 . (70)
Now, comparing (67) and (70), one should verify whether there exist a
common parameter range in which (63) and (64) are simultaneously satisﬁed
by some admissible integer k.7 It is quickly veriﬁed that this is never the
case, by observing that k+ − k+ = 1, (71)
so that we can formulate our result, in the following terms:
Proposition 7 The intervals of k wherein, respectively,
πms (k, n− k) ≥ πsm (n− k + 1, k − 1) ;
πsm (n− k, k) ≥ πms (k + 1, n− k − 1) ,
are disjoint for all admissible values of parameters {b, n, β, σ} . Consequently,
there exists no stable partition of the population of ﬁrms between the smart
and the myopic group.
7Needless to say, if condition (67) is not met, the analysis falls into the case of unilateral
deviation from the fully myopic allocation. Similarly, if (70) is not met, the analysis falls
in the case of unilateral deviation from the fully smart situation.
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We have already proved that the fully-myopic allocation, and the fully-
smart allocation can be stable equilibrium or not, depending on parameter
conﬁguration. The ﬁnal step of our argument consists in proving the following
Proposition 8 For any given parameter conﬁguration it is impossible that
the fully-smart allocation and the fully-myopic allocation are simultaneously
unstable. Consequently, for any given parameter conﬁguration, the instability
of the fully-smart allocation implies that the fully myopic allocation is an
equilibrium, and the instability of the fully-myopic allocation implies that the
fully-smart allocation is an equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. The instability of the situation in which
k = 0 requires n > n+ (as given by (43)) as a necessary condition, that is: n >
[σ (b+ β) + [2 (b+ β) + σ]
√
D]/(σ (b+ β)) where D = (b+ β) (b+ β + σ),
that is
(n− 1) > [2 (b+ β) + σ]
√
D
σ(b+ β)
(72)
The instability of the situation in which k is equal to n, as shown by (55),
requires σ < 2

1 +

2 + n (n− 2)

(b+ β) / (n− 1)2 which, in the presence
of the constraints holding in this model, corresponds to
(n− 1) < 2
√
D
σ
(73)
Now, (73) may be written as (n−1)σ/√D < 2 , while (72) is (n−1)σ/√D >
2+σ/(b+β), and clearly the two conditions can not hold simultaneously.
Taking into consideration the last two Propositions, we can conclude that
no stable partition of ﬁrms exists, such that heterogeneous behaviours are
simultaneously present in the industry in pure strategies. At the same time,
the simultaneous instability of the full myopic and the full smart allocation is
impossible. These properties prevent the perpetual mobility of ﬁrms across
smart and myopic groups to be observable. The fully-smart or the fully-
myopic allocation (or both) are stable. Furthermore, recalling the Pareto-
eﬃciency properties of diﬀerent allocation, we can state:
Corollary 9 If ﬁrms can choose whether or not to account for strategic in-
terdependence, that is, they can choose whether to behave as smart (oligopolis-
tic) or myopic (monopolistically competitive) ﬁrms, then three alternative
scenarios are possible:
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1. the unique equilibrium is an oligopolistic one in which all ﬁrms choose
to take into account strategic interdependence (fully smart allocation);
2. the unique equilibrium is a monopolistically competitive one in which
all ﬁrms choose to disregard strategic interdependence (fully myopic
allocation);
3. both the fully smart and the fully myopic allocations are equilibria.
In all cases, the fully myopic allocation is Pareto ineﬃcient for ﬁrms
with respect to the fully smart allocation, irrespective of the equilibrium
conﬁguration.
Table 1 provides a simple numerical simulation, illustrating the diﬀerent
cases that may arise. In case (A), the fully-smart allocation is the only
equilibrium situation: in this case, even if the allocation occurred in which all
ﬁrms are myopic (k = 4), an individual incentive would exist for a myopic ﬁrm
to behave as smart (206.7 > 206.6), but such an allocation (with 3 myopic and
1 smart ﬁrms) would again be unstable, since a unilateral incentive would still
exist for a myopic to behave as smart (206.90>206.8), and so on. In the case
where all ﬁrms are smart, no incentive exists to change one’s own behaviour
(207.3 < 207.4). In case (B), both the fully smart and the fully myopic
allocations are equilibria, in the sense that no individual proﬁt incentive
to change unilaterally the behaviour is operating. It remains true that the
situation in which all ﬁrms are myopic is ineﬃcient for them as compared
to the case in which all ﬁrms are smart. Notice also that, starting from the
situation in which k = 3, an individual incentive would exist for a smart (the
smart, to be precise) ﬁrm to behave as myopic (27.7 > 27.6); at the same
time, an individual incentive exists for a myopic ﬁrm to change its behaviour
(given the others’ behaviours), since 31.2 > 31.1.8 Finally, in scenario (C),
8Clearly, if a smart ﬁrm turns its behaviour into myopic, and simultaneoulsy a myopic
ﬁrm turns its behaviour into smart, one would observe a stable partition, as far as the
size of the two diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms is concerned. Such an argument could support
the empirical evidence that the partition of a mixed population of ﬁrms within the same
industry may appear to be stable. However, this situation can not be interpreted as a
stable equilibrium - at least if one focuses on pure strategies. On the other hand, the mixed
population outcome can be interpreted as the empirical counterpart of an equilibrium in
mixed strategy, which clearly exists in cases replicating scenario (B). The formal proof of
the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium has been provided in subsection 2.1
for the 2 player case and it is omitted for the sake of brevity in the general setting with n
players.
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the only stable allocation is that of a generalised myopia, although it is
Pareto-ineﬃcient. The reason why the eﬃcient situation (k = 0) is unstable
is clear: starting from a situation in which all ﬁrms are smart, an individual
incentive for a ﬁrm to change its behaviour operates, provided all other ﬁrms
do not change their behaviour (2869 > 2861). The situation depicted by (C)
clearly resembles the prisoners’ dilemma story: the eﬃcient allocation is not
an equilibrium due to the individual incentive to deviate; hence, if all players
deviate, the (Pareto-ineﬃcient) equilibrium establishes.
Table 1
27
4 Robustness and extensions
The model can be modiﬁed, to take into consideration asymmetric costs.
For instance, in the two-player case it is very simple to compute the out-
come, and to evaluate the equilibrium outcomes, if one ﬁrm has c = 0, and
the other c > 0; or the case in which β is nil for one ﬁrm and positive for
the other. We have stretched the model along these routes, to understand
whether exogenous asymmetry across ﬁrms could support heterogeneous be-
havioural rules at equilibrium. As a matter of fact, in no cases (under the
simple assumptions at hand) we have found that the mixed population can
be a stable equilibrium in pure strategies. These elements provide robustness
to our theoretical conclusions. Of course (and trivially), there is a condition
whereby a mixed population can be an equilibrium, namely, that the col-
lection of information by at least part of the ﬁrms is a costly activity: in
such a situation, for suﬃciently large information cost, some ﬁrms may ﬁnd
it convenient to behave myopically, while other ﬁrms ﬁnd it convenient to
behave smartly.
In general, our model rules out the coexistence of heterogeneous behav-
iours across ﬁrms serving a market as an equilibrium - at least in pure strate-
gies - when ﬁrms can choose endogenously whether or not to consider the
interdependence links, and do so for free. However, one could argue that in
some markets in the real world oligopolistic behaviour coexists with a mo-
nopolistically competitive one. Just to give a few examples, let us think of
consumer electronics. This market is indeed simultaneously supplied by large
ﬁrms with well established brands commanding high mark-ups, and totally
aware of strategic interaction, as well as by other producers whose nature
is typically that of a population of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, with
brand counting much less or nothing at all and mark-ups consequently a lot
lower, if not nil. The ﬁlm industry may be an additional example: a few
large (world-wide) ﬁlm production companies (adopting a neatly oligopolis-
tic behaviour) coexist with several small (generally local) producers, that
usually behave as monopolistic ﬁrms within speciﬁc niches. Again, we can
think of book markets, which are served by both large chainstores and small
specialised shops: likely, the former behave as oligopolistic and the latter as
monopolistically competitive sellers. Three considerations are in order. First,
we could argue that these empirical situations ﬁnd a theoretical counterpart
in our model, as we show that an equilibrium in mixed strategy exists, when
two pure-strategy equilibria are present. Second, we would like to mention
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that in those markets where (large) oligopolistic ﬁrms coexist with (small)
monopolistically competitive providers, one is typically concerned about the
possible disappearance of small shops serving speciﬁc niches, entailing a loss
of product variety and a detrimental eﬀect on consumer surplus. From this
standpoint, our model could lend support to such concern, showing that the
mixed setting is not stable, and the fully oligopolistic setting provides larger
proﬁts to ﬁrms; however, it goes without saying that our present model takes
the number of operative ﬁrms in a market as given, and it does not inves-
tigate exit decision. Third, we have already recalled that a recent, speciﬁc
literature investigates markets in which large oligopolistic ﬁrms co-exist with
a fringe of atomistic monopolistically competitive rivals (see, e.g., Anderson
et al., 2013; Parenti, 2013; Shimomura and Thisse, 2014). In this literature,
however, the diﬀerent nature of ﬁrms is exogenously given as monopolisti-
cally competitive ﬁrms cannot turn their behavior into oligopolistic. At most,
oligopolistic ﬁrms may choose to divisionalize with divisions then behaving
as monopolistic competitors.
The instability of the mixed setting could represent a partial justiﬁcation
of the fact that basic theoretical models usually disregard mixed market
conﬁgurations. At the same time, our present theoretical investigation makes
clear that the simple assumption of pure oligopolistic versus monopolistically
competitive market structure should be motivated and based on structural
features of markets and ﬁrms, such as the key parameters scaling marginal
and average production cost and product substitutability, in relation with
the population of ﬁrms.
5 Concluding remarks
We have taken into account the possibility for ﬁrms of strategically choosing
whether or not to consider the eﬀect of their own production decision upon
the market allocation. This amounts to saying that ﬁrms can choose whether
to behave in an oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive way. Our ap-
proach has shown that the textbook assumption of oligopolistic markets or
monopolistically competitive settings is far from being an innocent and ro-
bust assumption, if ﬁrms can strategically choose whether or not to consider
the eﬀect of their decision on the market aggregate supply, and hence the
strategic interdependence links among themselves.
It could appear a little bit strange that a ﬁrm can choose to disregard
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relevant information, and speciﬁcally the information concerning interdepen-
dence links among ﬁrms and the eﬀect of its own production level choice on
the whole market. However, in diﬀerent contexts, theoretical and experimen-
tal economic literature proves that the value of information can be negative,
so that, under some admissible circumstances, it can be convenient for in-
dividuals to disregard relevant pieces of information. More importantly, we
have shown that a ﬁrm can easily resort to meaningful mechanism to commit
itself to disregard the interdependence links: for example, a managerial dele-
gation contract, with a speciﬁc remuneration structure for managers, can lead
an oligopolistic ﬁrm to behave as if it disregarded altogether the information
concerning the interdependence links, that is, as if it were a monopolistically
competitive ﬁrm.
We have studied the individual incentive for a proﬁt-seeking ﬁrm to con-
sider or not the strategic interdependence link in a market for diﬀerentiated
goods served by n ≥ 2 producers. We have focused on the supply side, leav-
ing consumer surplus and welfare aside. We have shown that the unilateral
deviation from a situation in which all ﬁrms behave as oligopolistic subjects
may be individually convenient under certain parameter conditions, and, in
particular, if the ﬁrms’ population is large. Also the unilateral deviation from
the fully monopolistically competitive setting is proﬁtable under speciﬁc cir-
cumstances. More speciﬁcally, this happens when the population of ﬁrms is
small. In case of mixed behaviours within the ﬁrms’ population, for a given
partition of ﬁrms between oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive sell-
ers, the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms obtain a larger proﬁt than the
oligopolistic ones, essentially because the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms
constraint themselves to larger production levels. However, such a situation
can not be a stable partition. Indeed, we have shown that an individual
proﬁt incentive to switch to the alternative behaviour is always present. We
have also shown that, depending on the parameter constellation, three cases
are possible: one where the unique equilibrium is purely oligopolistic; one in
which the unique equilibrium is the monopolistically competitive outcome;
and the other in which both emerge as pure-strategy equilibria. In this last
case, one can not disregard the equilibrium in mixed strategies, which de-
livers a theoretical foundation to the observation of mixed structures in the
real world. Be that as it may, the only Pareto eﬃcient outcome from the
standpoint of ﬁrms is that where all of them behave as oligopolistic agents.
As a last observation, it is worth stressing that all of the above consider-
ations stem from comparative statics carried out on a static model. A truly
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dynamic approach identifying the elements driving the ﬁrms’ choices in terms
of their degree of awareness about strategic interdependence is in our future
research agenda.
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